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Germany has traditionally been one of the most consistent proponents of European integration. It was one of the six members of the three original European communities and, along with France, has often been regarded as the "motor" of European integration. In more recent years, Germany championed monetary union and the enlargement of European Union to include many of the Central European countries of the former Soviet bloc.
When it comes to recent developments in EU energy policy, however, Germany has exhibited much more ambivalence. It has backed some EU energy policy initiatives, especially those concerning climate change, renewable sources of energy, and energy conservation. But it has resisted a number of others, such as the liberalization of the gas and electricity markets and the creation of a common external energy policy. And even in cases where Germany has been generally supportive of a common energy policy objective, is has often fought hard to put its own stamp on the details, such as the mechanisms for promoting renewable energy sources and the implementation of the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS).
This chapter explores the mixed pattern of German support for a common EU energy policy over the past decade. It begins by describing Germany's energy situation at the beginning of the 2000s and the energy challenges Germany has faced in recent years. It then describes the key features of German energy policy over the same period and how these have played themselves out at the EU level. A fourth section explores the determinants of German energy policy and its ambivalent attitude toward a common EU energy policy. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implication of German policy for the future of EU energy policy.
A. Background

Germany's Energy Mix in 2000
As Germany entered the 2000s, its mix of energy sources had changed substantially since before the first oil shock in 1973. Oil continued to command the biggest share of Germany's primary energy consumption (PEC), at just under 40 percent. But this figure was down substantially from the peak of 57 percent in the former West Germany, reached in the early 1970s (BP 2010) . Virtually all of the oil consumed in Germany was imported, with nearly onethird coming from Russia (IEA 2002, 58) . But this import dependence raised few concerns, since petroleum and petroleum products from one foreign supplier can be substituted relatively easily by those from another.
Next came coal, which accounted for just over a quarter of Germany's PEC, a figure that had been fairly steady since the mid-1990s. Coal, especially brown coal (lignite), generated more than half of Germany's electricity, while hard coal was used in steel production. Although domestic coal production had declined as inefficient mines were closed, especially in the former eastern states, it still provided for about two-thirds of German coal consumption.
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Third on the list was natural gas, which had met about 22 percent of Germany's energy needs since the mid-1990s. Germany was not entirely dependent on gas imports, producing about 20 percent of its consumption at home. But most imported gas arrived via fixed pipelines from just three countries --Russia (45 percent in 2002), Norway (27 percent), and the Netherlands (22 percent) -and could not easily be replaced in the event of a supply disruption (AGEB 2010; IEA 2002, 76) .
Nuclear power plants accounted for 30 percent of electricity production in 2000. At the time, Germany had 19 operating commercial nuclear reactors, but none had come on line since 1988, and the former East German reactors had all been shut down for safety reasons (IEA 2002, 111) .
Bringing up the rear were renewable sources of energy. These accounted for just 3.4 percent of PEC and 7.3 percent of electric power generation in 2000. But the contribution from renewable sources was growing rapidly, having doubled since 1990. In 2000, Germany was the world leader in wind power production and had the highest installed solar electric capacity in Europe (IEA 2002, 91-92 ).
General Goals and Challenges of German Energy Policy in the 2000s
German energy policy has been guided by three primary goals: 1) economic efficiency, especially in the form of affordable energy prices (Wirtschaftlichkeit);
2) environmental protection and sustainability (Umweltverträglichkeit); and 3) security of supply (Versorgungssicherheit).
Economic efficiency has been perhaps the most constant goal of postwar German energy policy. During the second half of the 1980s and most of the 1990s, its achievement did not seem particularly problematic. Energy, and especially oil, prices were generally low. In the late 1990s 220 and 2000s, however, it became a matter of increasing concern as oil prices rose more or less steadily.
In comparison, environmental sustainability is a relatively new goal. It first appeared in the 1970s in the form of worries about the safety of nuclear power plants and the disposal of nuclear waste. Since the late 1980s and 1990s, however, increasing attention has been devoted to the closely related challenges of climate change and reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, much of which are attributable to energy consumption. Public concern about climate change reached a crescendo in 2007, with the publication by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change of its Fourth Assessment Report, but the issue has often dominated the German energy policy agenda in recent years.
In response, the government has adopted a series of ambitious goals and programs. In 1995, it established a goal of cutting CO2 emissions by 25 percent over the period 1990-2005. And at the end of the 1990s, it agreed to reduce its GHG emissions by 21 percent (compared to 1990 levels) within the EU Burden-Sharing Agreement under the Kyoto Protocol (IEA 2002, 38) . In 2000, the government adopted a comprehensive National Climate Protection Programme.
And the Integrated Energy and Climate Programme (IECP) approved by the government in 2007 was largely, if not entirely, aimed at the addressing the problem of climate change (Duffield 2009 (IEA 2002, 28) , raised few alarms. German officials emphasized that the country's energy supplies were highly reliable. Russia, like the Soviet Union before it, could be counted on for promised deliveries of oil and gas, and Germany possessed large petroleum stockpiles and gas storage facilities that it could draw upon in the event of an emergency.
Thus energy security did not regain prominence as a policy issue until the beginning of 2006. The occasion was the gas dispute that erupted that January between Russia and Ukraine.
Over the next several years, additional events raised further questions about Russia's dependability as an energy supplier.
B. Key Elements of German Energy Policy in the 2000s
How has Germany sought to promote its energy policy goals and address the corresponding challenges in the past decade?
One major thrust of Germany policy, which dates back to the 1970s, has been to reduce energy consumption by increasing energy efficiency. Germany had long maintained substantial excise taxes on most fossil fuels, and in 1999, the government introduced a new "eco tax" on motor fuels, heating fuels, and electricity, which was gradually raised over the next four years and was intended in large part to encourage energy savings. Early in the 2000s, the government quickly implemented EU directives on energy labeling of appliances and the energy performance A somewhat newer but equally important component of German policy has been the promotion of renewable energy sources, especially for electricity production. The use of renewables could serve to reduce both greenhouse gas emissions and fossil fuel imports. The first major step was the 1991 Electricity Feed Law, which obliged power companies to buy all the electricity generated from wind, hydropower, biomass, and solar energy in their distribution areas at a price, or feed-in tariff, based on the end-use cost to consumers. The 2000 Renewable
Energy Act extended coverage to additional renewable sources, such as landfill gas and geothermal energy, and revised the feed-in tariff formula to reflect the cost of each technology and to provide long-term certainty for both developers and users (IEA 2002, 93-94) .
As a result of these incentives, German renewable energy output grew at an annual rate of While consistently promoting energy efficiency and renewables, recent Germany energy policy has been less consistent in other areas. One has been the issue of energy market structure.
The German government has frequently expressed support for competitive energy markets,
223
largely as a way of holding down energy prices. But it has also supported the establishment and maintenance of large national energy companies that could use domestic market power to increase their leverage in negotiations with foreign energy companies, such as Gazprom (Buchan 2009, 16) . Thus when the Federal Cartel Office rejected the merger of one of the four dominant electric utilities, E.On, with the leading natural gas supplier, Ruhrgas, It was overruled by the Federal Minister of Economics (BWMi)  1 (Müller 2007, 32-33; Westphal 2007, 100) . For domestic political and social reasons, the government also maintained subsidies for hard coal production, although in 2007 an agreement was reached to phase them out over the following decade.
Inconsistency has also characterized Germany policy toward nuclear power, despite the widespread revival of interest in nuclear power -the so-called "nuclear renaissance" --that A final important aspect of German energy policy that has seen changing emphasis has been the external dimension. The Red-Green coalition, headed by Gerhard Schröder, emphasized building and maintaining bilateral ties with Russia (see the contribution by Grätz in this volume). It promoted in particular the construction by a consortium of Russian and German energy companies of a natural gas pipeline under the North Sea that would link Germany directly to Russian gas supplies. In the view of one experienced observer, "Germany has asserted that it reserves the right to work out its long-term energy security with Russia on a bilateral, mutually beneficial, pragmatic footing -and that it brooks no outside or third-party intervention" (Bhadrakumar 2006) .
Although led by a former Schröder protégé, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the foreign ministry in the subsequent Black-Red grand coalition placed more emphasis on multilaterism.
The overall goal was to promote greater dialogue among producer, consumer, and transit countries in order to emphasize their common interest in stable and predictable energy trade.
Steinmeier repeatedly called for the creation of a system of cooperation energy security, which, he argued, would help to build mutual understanding and trust. And with regard to Russia in particular, the new government's principal approach was to try to embed Russia in a multilateral rule-based framework for trade and investment based on liberal principles of market access. The foreign ministry hoped to induce Russia to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty and its important 225 transit protocol and, that failing, to replace the expiring EU-Russia partnership and cooperation agreement (PCA) with a new one that contained a substantial section on energy (Duffield 2009 ). In other respects, however, Germany has resisted movement in the direction of a common EU energy policy. In this regard, there was little change from the previous decade, when the government was described as one of those most reluctant to see a European energy policy develop, preferring to retain autonomy in the pursuit of supply security… (Jochem et al. 1996, 226 82) In the 2000s, Germany opposed the inclusion of an energy chapter in the proposed European constitution, when that ill-fated project was still being considered (Müller 2005, 178) . Although an energy chapter was eventually included in the Lisbon Treaty, which stood in for the unsuccessful constitutional project, it nevertheless reflected Germany's consistent insistence that each member state should be free to determine its own energy mix, a position that became only more rigid following the decision to phase-out nuclear power plants. With regard to more specific aspects of EU energy policy, Germany has resisted many of the Commission's initiatives for liberalizing the gas and electricity markets. And the external aspects of German energy policy have often had the effect, whether intentionally or not, of making it difficult for the EU to speak with one voice on energy issues.
Areas of Support
Germany has been most supportive of EU initiatives in the areas of energy efficiency, Commission found this inadequate and unilaterally cut the proposed allocation by another seven percent, to 453 million tonnes, a level that the government was eventually forced to accept (Müller 2007, 31) . More recently, Germany has criticized Commission proposals to reduce substantially the total allowed number of permits, to begin auctioning permits (rather than continuing to give them away to industry and utilities), and to centralize the auctioning of 228 emissions permits (rather than allowing each member state to conduct its own auctions) (Phillips 2008; Wettestad in this volume). Germany has also sought to give generous emissions allowances to coal-fired power plants (IEA 2007, 12 and 29) .
Areas of Resistance
Germany has exhibited even more ambivalence toward the EU's project to create a single internal energy market. The German government has frequently expressed its support for this goal. For example, during its 2007 EU Presidency, the completion of the internal energy market was sometimes described as the government's "highest priority." In practice, however, Germany has put up considerable resistance to the proposals emanating from Brussels almost every step of the way (see also Buchan 2009, 21 ).
This resistance began in the 1990s, when the first EU directives on the electricity and gas markets were negotiated. Even then, in contrast to its professed free market approach to the energy sector, the German government has been rather ambivalent about the liberalization of energy utility markets both at home and in a European context. It has offered only half-hearted support to the Commission in its attempts to open up electricity markets while it was strongly opposed to similar moves in the gas sector (Jochem et al. 1996, 82) For example, Germany opposed the Commission's proposal that third party access (TPA) to the electricity grids be regulated as a way of reducing hidden barriers to entry and instead insisted on including the option of negotiated TPA, which Germany alone exercised. As a result, the German market remained effectively closed to foreign suppliers (IEA 2002, 108; Buchan 2008, 22) . by one or a small number of companies, however, expressed strong opposition to this proposal.
As a result, the Commission was forced to resort to its fall back position of mandating the establishment of independent system operators (ISO) that "manage and operate transmission system assets without influence from transmission owners, but do not own the assets themselves" (IEA 2007, 38 ). Yet even this compromise was not deemed sufficient by Germany and others.
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They insisted instead that the third package include the option for an independent transmission operator (ITO), which would not establish as many barriers between the network owners and operators (Buchan 2009, 72) .
Another aspect of the original Commission proposal that Germany successfully opposed was the so-called "reciprocity clause." As described in Eikeland and Grätz's contributions to this volume, this provision would have prevented companies from non-member countries from controlling gas and electricity networks unless an agreement on mutual market access to the transmission assets in the potential investor's home country had been concluded (see also Grätz 2009, 77) . Informally known as the "Gazprom clause," it was seen as being primarily aimed at
requiring Russia to open its energy market and transmission networks to third parties in return for allowing the Russian state-owned gas company to invest in EU markets.
This last element of German policy toward the liberalization of the EU energy markets is linked to its approach to external energy relations in the late 1990s and 2000s. During the RedGreen coalition, Germany became the driving force for a renewed, special EU-Russia partnership (Westphal 2007, 105) . As a practical matter, however, the government's external policy was characterized by a shift away from multilateralism to a more unilateral pursuit of national interests (Westphal 2007, 101, 111) . The government's efforts to help German energy companies become internationally competitive and expand their activities abroad (as a way of enhancing Germany's energy security) had negative implications for the EU's attempts at promoting multilateral governance and common institutions in relations with Russia. The Schröder government's use of its strong personal ties with the Putin administration to promote German-Russian energy relations undermined the Commission's efforts to establish a common foreign energy policy and, paradoxically, limited the opportunities of the EU as a whole to 231 diversify its energy supply and increase its energy security (Westphal 2007, 93, 112) . This approach was perhaps most evident in the Schröder government's strong backing of the Nord Stream pipeline project, which would provide a direct link between Germany and Russian gas supplies.
The prospects for German support for a common external EU energy policy seemed to improve during the subsequent grand coalition. From the outset, Chancellor Merkel exhibited more skepticism toward Russia, an attitude that was only reinforced by the Russia-Ukraine gas accompanied by concrete proposals to increase either the EU's legal competence or its institutional capacity to conduct a common external energy policy. To the contrary, Germany never relinquished its prerogatives to act unilaterally in this area.
D. Determinants of German Energy Policy
How are we to explain and understand Germany's mixed record of support for a common EU energy policy in recent years? A logical place to begin is with general societal preferences.
Of particular relevance in this context is the high level of concern about the environment that has characterized German society, although this environmentalism has, paradoxically, cut both ways.
On the one hand, acute concerns about climate change have done much to motivate significant efforts by governments of all political stripes to promote energy efficiency, renewable sources of 232 energy, and reductions in greenhouse gas emissions at both the national and European levels. On the other hand, widespread concern about nuclear power, ranging from ambivalence to outright opposition, underlay the Red-Green coalition's decision to phase-out nuclear power and the inability of any government to facilitate the construction of new power plants. These policies, in turn, have created an obstacle to cooperation with EU partners on some energy issues and reinforced Germany's determination to maintain national autonomy over the choice of energy sources.
Arguably, however, an even more important determinant has been the structure of the energy economy, especially those aspects concerning electricity and gas. Ironically, as the EU has sought to increase competition in the gas and electricity markets, those industries have been concentrated in fewer hands in Germany. The number of major supraregional gas companies that owned the major pipeline systems and accounted for most of Germany's gas imports declined from six to as few as four during the 2000s (IEA 2002, 73-74; IEA 2007, 99) .
Similarly, electricity generation and transmission have been dominated by just four supraregional companies --E.ON, RWE, EnBW, and Vattenfall --that control about three-quarters of the country's generation capacity and have accounted for an even higher percentage of the electricity actually produced (IEA 2007, 127) . These companies have divided Germany into four regions in which they act as quasi-monopolies (Müller 2007, 29) .
Two characteristics of the major energy companies have underpinned German resistance to the creation a common EU energy policy. First, as suggested above, they are vertically integrated. Not only do the Big Four electricity companies produce and transmit most of the electricity, but they also dominate retail supply and distribution, in part through cross-ownership of municipal utilities and in part directly (IEA 2007, 30; Müller 2007, 29) . Such vertical 233 integration furthers the narrow commercial interests of the companies themselves. But some have argued that it also serves the national interest, by enabling German companies to compete with other national champions in the EU and by increasing their leverage in negotiations with foreign suppliers (see also Eikeland's contribution to this volume). In any case, the German electricity and gas companies have strongly lobbied at the national and EU levels against such measures as legal and ownership unbundling in order to maintain their profitable vertically integrated corporate structures as well as their oligopolistic market structures.
The other important characteristic with implications for Germany's support for a common EU energy policy are the close ties that the gas companies have with Russia. Ruhrgas, now E.On Ruhrgas, is currently the largest foreign shareholder in Gazprom, with about 6.4
percent of the shares, and it has a strategic interest in maintaining close energy ties with Gazprom and in expanding into the exploration and production of Russian gas because it produces only five percent of the gas it sells. Likewise, BASF Wintershall has a history of various cross-ownership deals with Gazprom. Both companies hold long-term gas delivery contracts with Russia that extend beyond 2030.
These structural linkages between German and Russian companies created an alliance of interests that undermined, or at least weakened, the Commission's efforts to extend competition within and beyond the EU's borders (Westphal 2007, 105) . The German gas importers prefer to minimize competition on the German market because of the vulnerability inherent in their longterm purchasing contracts from Gazprom (Müller 2007, 39) . In addition, E.On Ruhrgas and
Wintershall lobbied strongly for the Nord Stream project, in which they were junior partners to Gazprom, because it would strengthen their position on the international and EU markets (Westphal 2007, 111) .
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This discussion of the electricity and gas industries raises the issue of the relationship between business and government. The interests of the energy companies would not matter so much if they did not receive expression in government policy. In fact, however, many companies have enjoyed close links with, and presumably have exercised considerable influence over, at least parts of the government, and these ties may have grown even stronger during the late 1990s and early 2000s when the government was negotiating the first stages of the liberalization process and the nuclear phase out (Westphal 2007, 105 ). It is not just a matter of industry using its allies in government to do its bidding, however.
The relationship is more complicated than that. While the companies seek to influence the government in order to promote their self-interest, many government officials view strong energy companies as serving German national interests.
A final factor shaping German policy has been differences in the orientations of the major political parties. The SPD has traditionally been more open to cooperation with first the Soviet Union and then Russia, while the CDU/CSU has been more wary. These differences were on display in the contrasting approaches of Schröder and Merkel, described above. In addition, the CDU/CSU has been more supportive of European integration and market liberalization. 
E. Conclusion
Germany has traditionally been a leading proponent of European integration. Yet in recent years, it has been ambivalent about, if not downright antagonistic toward, the creation of a common EU energy policy. Successive German governments have resisted or at least not supported some of the most central elements of EU policy, especially energy market liberalization and external energy relations.
This ambivalence has been grounded in large part in the structure of the German energy sector, which has been dominated by a small number of gas and electricity companies, and the particular interests of those powerful companies. Those companies have opposed various efforts to liberalize the gas and electricity markets and have sought to retain a free hand in negotiations with foreign suppliers such as Gazprom. In turn, successive German governments have tended to give voice to those commercial interests in negotiations at the EU level.
Even where German officials might see some advantage, such as lower energy prices, in supporting Commission initiatives, they confront a "chicken-and-egg" problem. Until the
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European energy markets are fully integrated and liberalized, the security of Germany's energy supply will depend to an important extent on the maintenance of strong national companies that can compete and negotiate on roughly equal terms with state-owned enterprises and powerful foreign energy interests. But as long as they exist, those same companies will lobby against further liberalization measures.
Nevertheless, the last couple of years have seen some developments that provide reasons for optimism. In 2008, several of the large German energy utilities, including E.On, RWE, and
Vattenfall, under pressure from the Commission for allegedly engaging in uncompetitive practices, decided to sell their transmission networks. This unexpected development raised hopes that other giant energy concerns, in Germany and elsewhere, would follow suit.
An even more recent development has brought German policy more in line with that of the other major EU member states as well as the preferences of the Commission. In 2009, national elections brought to power a new government that promised to review German energy policy, especially the nuclear phase-out decision. The following year, the Black-Yellow coalition prepared a new energy concept paper that called for extending the lifetimes of the remaining nuclear power plants (BMWi/BMU 2010).
In addition, the new energy concept suggests a greater degree of emphasis on pursuing Germany's energy policy goals at the European level. One of the longest (of nine) section is devoted to the issue of energy supply in the European and international context. Other proposed steps including supporting the import of green electricity from third countries and pushing forward the creation of an integrated electricity market through new transmission lines in Europe and beyond. Nevertheless, it is too soon to tell whether these developments suggest more than minor adjustments in German policy, rather than a fundamental reorientation.
